Published, forthcoming, and commissioned work (equal contributions by all coauthors unless noted otherwise):
"Essence, Modality, and Identity" (w/ Fabrice Correia), forthcoming in Mind.
"Should Explanation Be a Guide to Ground?" (w/ Kelly Trogdon), forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
"Metaphysical Explanation" (first author w/ Anna-Sofia Maurin; also w/ Andrew Brenner, Naomi Thompson, and Robin Stenwall), forthcoming in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Grounding and Metametaphysics" (w/ Kelly Trogdon), in The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, eds. Ricki Bliss and J. T. M. Miller, 2021, Routledge, pp. 199-210.
"Necessity", in The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, ed. Michael Raven, 2020, Routledge, pp. 148-163.
"There is No Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem", Analysis, 2019, 79 (3), pp. 477-484.
"Grounding, Essence, and Identity" (w/ Fabrice Correia), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019, 98 (3), pp. 642-670.
“Emergence Reinflated”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2016, 66 (265), pp. 833-842.
“In Defense of the Disjunctive”, Inquiry, 2016, 59 (5), pp. 471-487.
“Against Grounding Necessitarianism”, Erkenntnis, 2015, 80, pp. 717-751.
“Essence in Abundance”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 45 (1), pp. 100-112.
“Is There A Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist?”, Synthese, 2014, 191 (15), pp. 3649-3659.
“Primitivism About Intrinsicality”, in Companion to Intrinsic Properties, ed. Robert Francescotti, 2014, De Gruyter, pp. 221-252.
“Time, Modality, and the Unbearable Lightness of Being” (w/ Akiko Frischhut), Thought, 2013, 2 (1), pp. 264-273.
“Underdetermination as a Path to Structural Realism” (w/ Katherine Brading), in Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality , eds. Elaine Landry and Dean Rickles, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, 2012, pp. 99-115.
“Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1), 2009, pp. 149-154.
Work-in-progress or under review (please contact me for a copy):
- A paper exploring (and criticizing) the view that certain facts are grounded in nothing ('zero-grounded') without being ungrounded
- A paper on how grounding and composition give rise to 'nothing over and aboveness'
- A paper on how identity explanations work in the sciences
- A paper arguing that grounding and essentialist explanations work like identity explanations
- A paper on reductively analyzing what existence is in terms of second-order quantification
- A paper on the relevance of Nāgārjuna's metametaphysics to contemporary work on the fundamental-derivative distinction
Dissertation:
Getting Grounded: Essays on the Metaphysics of Fundamentality
University of Notre Dame; advised by Michael Rea (chair), Samuel Newlands, Jonathan Schaffer, Jeff Speaks, and Peter van Inwagen
Defended August 2012 w/ highest grade of “Excellent” for both written content and the oral defense
When doing metaphysics, it is frequently convenient and sometimes essential to rely upon various concepts of fundamentality when articulating the problems, positions, and arguments at issue. But what it is, exactly, that these concepts are supposed to track remains obscure. The goal of this dissertation is to develop and defend a theory about the metaphysics of fundamentality; by doing so, I clarify and vindicate the roles that concepts of fundamentality play in metaphysics. At the theory’s core are two other concepts frequently relied upon in metaphysical inquiry: something’s being ‘derived’ from or holding ‘wholly in virtue of’ something else (the concept of grounding), and something’s being ‘reducible’ or ‘non-circularly definable’ in terms of something else (the concept of reductive analysis).
I begin by arguing that concepts of grounding ought to serve as a foundation for understanding the metaphysics of fundamentality more generally (Chapter 2, “Grounding the Metaphysics of Fundamentality”), and then propose an account of reductive analysis that retains the traditional insight that a reductive analysis purports to describe the constituents of a property or fact and depict how they are structured together (Chapter 3, “On What Consists in What”). I then argue that even though grounding and reduction are distinct, facts about grounding can be understood wholly and without circularity in terms of facts about reductive analysis (Chapter 4, “Getting Grounded”). Finally, I conclude by challenging the widespread assumption in literature on the metaphysics of fundamentality, and in first-order disputes about what grounds what, that a fact is necessitated by the facts that ground it (Chapter 5, “Against Grounding Necessitarianism”).
Book reviews:
"Review of Correia and Schnieder’s Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality“, Analysis, 74 (3), 2013, pp. 543-546.
"Essence, Modality, and Identity" (w/ Fabrice Correia), forthcoming in Mind.
"Should Explanation Be a Guide to Ground?" (w/ Kelly Trogdon), forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
"Metaphysical Explanation" (first author w/ Anna-Sofia Maurin; also w/ Andrew Brenner, Naomi Thompson, and Robin Stenwall), forthcoming in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Grounding and Metametaphysics" (w/ Kelly Trogdon), in The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, eds. Ricki Bliss and J. T. M. Miller, 2021, Routledge, pp. 199-210.
"Necessity", in The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, ed. Michael Raven, 2020, Routledge, pp. 148-163.
"There is No Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem", Analysis, 2019, 79 (3), pp. 477-484.
"Grounding, Essence, and Identity" (w/ Fabrice Correia), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019, 98 (3), pp. 642-670.
“Emergence Reinflated”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2016, 66 (265), pp. 833-842.
“In Defense of the Disjunctive”, Inquiry, 2016, 59 (5), pp. 471-487.
“Against Grounding Necessitarianism”, Erkenntnis, 2015, 80, pp. 717-751.
“Essence in Abundance”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 45 (1), pp. 100-112.
“Is There A Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist?”, Synthese, 2014, 191 (15), pp. 3649-3659.
“Primitivism About Intrinsicality”, in Companion to Intrinsic Properties, ed. Robert Francescotti, 2014, De Gruyter, pp. 221-252.
“Time, Modality, and the Unbearable Lightness of Being” (w/ Akiko Frischhut), Thought, 2013, 2 (1), pp. 264-273.
“Underdetermination as a Path to Structural Realism” (w/ Katherine Brading), in Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality , eds. Elaine Landry and Dean Rickles, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, 2012, pp. 99-115.
“Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1), 2009, pp. 149-154.
Work-in-progress or under review (please contact me for a copy):
- A paper exploring (and criticizing) the view that certain facts are grounded in nothing ('zero-grounded') without being ungrounded
- A paper on how grounding and composition give rise to 'nothing over and aboveness'
- A paper on how identity explanations work in the sciences
- A paper arguing that grounding and essentialist explanations work like identity explanations
- A paper on reductively analyzing what existence is in terms of second-order quantification
- A paper on the relevance of Nāgārjuna's metametaphysics to contemporary work on the fundamental-derivative distinction
Dissertation:
Getting Grounded: Essays on the Metaphysics of Fundamentality
University of Notre Dame; advised by Michael Rea (chair), Samuel Newlands, Jonathan Schaffer, Jeff Speaks, and Peter van Inwagen
Defended August 2012 w/ highest grade of “Excellent” for both written content and the oral defense
When doing metaphysics, it is frequently convenient and sometimes essential to rely upon various concepts of fundamentality when articulating the problems, positions, and arguments at issue. But what it is, exactly, that these concepts are supposed to track remains obscure. The goal of this dissertation is to develop and defend a theory about the metaphysics of fundamentality; by doing so, I clarify and vindicate the roles that concepts of fundamentality play in metaphysics. At the theory’s core are two other concepts frequently relied upon in metaphysical inquiry: something’s being ‘derived’ from or holding ‘wholly in virtue of’ something else (the concept of grounding), and something’s being ‘reducible’ or ‘non-circularly definable’ in terms of something else (the concept of reductive analysis).
I begin by arguing that concepts of grounding ought to serve as a foundation for understanding the metaphysics of fundamentality more generally (Chapter 2, “Grounding the Metaphysics of Fundamentality”), and then propose an account of reductive analysis that retains the traditional insight that a reductive analysis purports to describe the constituents of a property or fact and depict how they are structured together (Chapter 3, “On What Consists in What”). I then argue that even though grounding and reduction are distinct, facts about grounding can be understood wholly and without circularity in terms of facts about reductive analysis (Chapter 4, “Getting Grounded”). Finally, I conclude by challenging the widespread assumption in literature on the metaphysics of fundamentality, and in first-order disputes about what grounds what, that a fact is necessitated by the facts that ground it (Chapter 5, “Against Grounding Necessitarianism”).
Book reviews:
"Review of Correia and Schnieder’s Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality“, Analysis, 74 (3), 2013, pp. 543-546.
